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Abstract
A principal wants an agent to complete a project. The agent under-
takes unobservable effort, which affects in each period the probability that
the project is completed. We characterise the contracts that the principal
sets, with and without commitment. With full commitment, the contract
involves the agent’s value and wage declining over time, in order to give the
agent incentives to exert effort. The best sequentially rational equilibrium
for the principal also involves the agent’s wage declining over time, while
the worst sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal has a constant
wage (and is in fact the unique stationary equilibrium). The best (weakly)
renegotiation-proof equilibrium for the principal is achieved by a constant
wage that maximizes the principals payoff, conditional on wages being con-
stant. We compare these solutions to the efficient outcome.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider a model in which a principal hires an agent to complete
a project. The principal gains no benefit until the project is completed. Project
completion and payments to the agent are the only verifiable events, since the
principal cannot observe the agent’s effort. The agent affects the probability
of project completion by exerting effort. The principal’s objective is to provide
the agent with dynamic incentives to exert effort. We assume that the agent
is risk neutral and subject to a limited liability constraint (in other words, the
agent cannot make payments to the principal). Hence our dynamic results arise
not from insurance motives, but from the optimal management of the agent’s
intertemporal surplus. The task of the paper is to analyse the dynamic incentives
that arise in these settings and the contracts that are written as a result.
Dynamics matter for both sides. For the agent, its myopic incentives are to
equate the marginal cost of effort with the marginal return. But if it fails to
complete the project today, it has a further chance tomorrow. This continuation
value means that the forward-looking agent reduces its current effort, substitut-
ing towards future effort. Hence this dynamic factor, all other things equal, tends
to reduce the agent’s effort towards project completion. Similarly, the principal’s
myopic incentives trade off the marginal costs of inducing greater agent effort
(through higher payments) with the marginal benefits. But the principal also
knows that the project can be completed tomorrow; all other things equal, this
tends to lower the payment that the principal pays today for project comple-
tion. On the other hand, the principal also realises that the agent faces dynamic
incentives; this factor, on its own, tends to increase the payment to the agent.
Our modelling approach allows us to resolve these different incentives to
arrive at analytical conclusions. After characterising the efficient solution, we
start by analysing the case in which the principal can commit to a full sequence
of future wages. We show the way in which the principal resolves in its favour
the trade-off between static incentives (which call for a high current wage) and
dynamic incentives (which call for lower future wages): the agent’s wage (and
effort) falls over time. This is in stark contrast to the efficient solution, where
effort is constant (when the principal and agent have the same discount rates);
or increasing exponentially over time (when the principal is the more patient).
We then move on to analyse sequentially rational equilibria, in which the
principal has no commitment ability but instead sets payments period-by-period.
We show that the (unique) stationary sequentially rational equilibrium, in which
the principal offers the same wage in each period and the agent takes the same
action, yields the lowest equilibrium payoff to the principal. We characterise
also the equilibrium yielding the highest payoff to the principal, linking it in an
intuitive way to the full commitment solution. In this equilibrium, the agent’s
wage declines over time up to some deadline, after which it is constant (and
positive). As in the full commitment solution, the declining payments give the
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agent an incentive to exert effort now rather than later. This is supported in
equilibrium by the threat to revert to the worst equilibrium if the principal
deviates. (Note that only deviations by the principal can be observed.) Finally,
we consider (weakly) renegotiation-proof equilibria, of which there are many. We
characterise the best equilibrium for the principal. It has a constant wage on
the equilibrium path, and yields a higher payoff to the principal than the unique
stationary equilibrium of the game.
As a real-world example to motivate our analysis, consider the on-going con-
struction of a nuclear power plant in Finland. Finnish parliamentary approval
for a fifth nuclear unit was granted in 2002. Areva, a French government-owned
nuclear energy company, began construction in 2005 at Olkiluoto, Finland to
build a European Pressurised Water Reactor (EPR) nuclear power plant. (See
Thomas (2009) for further details.) The buyer (i.e., principal) is Teollisuuden
Voima Oy (TVO), a company jointly owned by the Finnish government and
Finnish power companies. The contract signed between TVO and Areva was a
‘turnkey’ contract: Areva is obliged to provide all work, materials and services
necessary to enable TVO to ‘turn the key’ and take over an operational plant.
In order to be operational, the finished plant must be approved by the Finnish
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority. The agreement between the Finnish
government and the Finnish power companies is such that TVO secures the out-
put of the plant over its full life at prices set to fully cover whatever costs are
incurred. In short, the Olkiluoto plant is a project that has no value to the
principal before completion; for which completion is verifiable; and the value of
which the agent cannot influence. These are all features of our model.
The project has had a troubled history. The original contract specified a
completion date of 2009. From the start, problems arose so that after three
years of construction, the plant was three years behind schedule and Areva was
suffering severe losses. In December 2012, Areva estimated that the full cost
of building the reactor would be about $8.5 billion, or almost three times the
delivery price of $3.2 billion. TVO has not been able to give an estimate of when
the project will be completed; some commentators have stated that the startup
of the reactor could be delayed until at least 2018.1 While some of the problems
appear to have been outside of Areva’s control, others do not.
The contract signed between TVO and Areva involved a fixed price of e3.2
billion, with Areva bearing any costs in excess of that figure. The contract also
included a penalty clause for late completion of 0.2% of the contract cost per
week, up to 10% of cost. But in December 2008, TVO announced that Areva
had filed a request for arbitration with the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) concerning the delay and related costs. The case has yet to be settled, with
Areva claiming e2.7 billion to cover additional costs, and TVO counter-claiming
1See http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/28/tvo-olkiluoto-idUKL6N0LX3XQ20140228.
Link accessible on 12 March 2014.
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e1.8 billion in compensation for construction delays.2
Our theoretical model shows general features of the optimal contract for
the principal (in the example above, TVO) in different cases depending on the
principal’s ability to commit to a contract at the outset. In the two best cases for
the principal—the full commitment solution, and the best sequentially rational
equilibrium—the contract involves a completion payment that declines over time.
This feature matches the original contract agreed between TVO and Areva, with
the penalty clause for delay serving to reduce the completion payment made to
the agent. An unfortunate consequence of such decreasing reward schemes is
that the agent has less and less incentive to complete the task. In the Areva-
TVO case, this is reflected in the recent statement of the Finnish Minister of the
Environment: “The expected time to completion has never been this long during
the project”. Our model predicts that such outcomes with sub-optimal delays
can arise on the equilibrium path with positive probability. Another consequence
is that it is vulnerable to renegotiation. The legal manoeuvres by AREVA to
re-interpret the contract could be viewed in this light.
1.1 Literature review
Our work is most closely related to Bergemann and Hege (1998), (2005). In
these papers, the equilibrium contract involves a declining wage paid to the
agent. But these papers involve learning—that is, beliefs that are updated over
time; and hence the dynamics are driven by non-stationary beliefs. In contrast,
the equilibrium contract in our model can exhibit dynamics (depending on the
equilibrium), despite there being no learning, and the basic environment being
stationary. By allowing for a convex cost of effort for the agent, our model allows
a richer set of dynamic issues to arise. Our analysis of the best sequentially ratio-
nal contracting and the best weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria yield insights
that are not present in a model with binary effort choice (or equivalently, with a
linear cost of effort), which has been assumed in much of the previous literature.
More broadly, our work is related to the literature on dynamic moral haz-
ard problems: particularly the more recent work on continuous-time models.
This literature has demonstrated in considerable generality the benefits to the
principal of being able to condition contracts on the intertemporal performance
of the agent. By doing so, the principal can relax the agent’s incentive com-
patibility constraints; see, for example, Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988) and
Laffont and Martimort (2002). A number of recent papers (e.g., Sannikov (2007),
Sannikov (2008), Willams (2006), Biais et al. (2007) and Biais et al. (2010)) have
analysed principal-agent problems in continuous time. For example, in Sannikov
(2008), an agent controls the drift of a diffusion process, the realisation of which
in each period affects the principal’s payoff. When the agent’s action is unob-
2See http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/28/tvo-olkiluoto-idUKL6N0LX3XQ20140228.
Link accessible on 12 March 2014.
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served, Sannikov characterises the optimal contract quite generally, in terms of
the drift and volatility of the agent’s continuation value in the contract.
There are two main differences between this paper and e.g., Sannikov (2008)
First, we concentrate on project completion. We think this case is of indepen-
dent interest for a number of different economic applications. But we also think
that our setting, while less general in some respects than Sannikov’s, serves to
make very clear the intertemporal incentives at work. In Sannikov’s models, in-
centives may be back or front loaded: the agent’s value can drift either upward
or downward. In specific equilibria of interest in our model (the full commit-
ment solution, and the best sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal),
the agent’s value drifts in only one direction: downwards. This is a direct con-
sequence of the project completion setting. Secondly, as a result of focussing
on project completion, we are able analyse a range of equilibria—not just the
full commitment case studied by Sannikov—identifying key differences between
them.
The results in the full commitment solution of our model are reminiscent of
those in papers (such as Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997)) that look at unemployment insurance. In these papers, a government
must make payments to an unemployed worker to provide a minimum level of
expected discounted utility to the worker. The worker can exert effort to find a
job; the government wants to minimise the total cost of providing unemployment
insurance. Shavell and Weiss (1979) show that the optimal benefit payments
to the unemployed worker should decrease over time. Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997) establish that the government can improve things by imposing a tax on
the individual when it finds work.
Some aspects of our analysis are similar: for example, that the principal’s
optimal payment under full commitment decreases over time (c.f., decreasing
unemployment benefits over time). The economic forces at work are different,
of course. In the unemployment insurance papers, the need to smooth over time
the consumption of the risk-averse worker constrains the incentives that can be
offered through unemployment benefits. In this paper, the risk neutral agent
smooths its effort over time; the principal sets a declining wage to counteract
this incentive. But other aspects of our analysis are quite different. First, we
go beyond the unemployment insurance papers by analysing the full commit-
ment solution for all possible values of the discount rates of the principal and
agent. This shows the importance of relative levels of patience in determining
intertemporal incentives. Secondly, we provide a full characterisation of the set
of sequentially rational equilibria, showing the benefits of commitment for the
principal.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic
model. Section 3 analyses the efficient benchmark where there is no need for
the principal to hire an agent, and hence there is no moral hazard problem.
Section 4 considers the case with moral hazard, in which the principal has full
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commitment power. Section 5 examines the opposite case in which the principal
has no commitment power, analysing the sequentially rational equilibria of the
game. Our overall conclusions are stated in Section 6. An Appendix contains
longer proofs.
2 The model
We consider the continuous-time limit of a discrete time model where an agent
must exert effort in any period in order to have a positive probability of success
in a project. We assume that the effort choices of the agent are unobservable but
the success of the project is verifiable; hence payments can be contingent only
on the event of success or no success.
The principal and the agent are risk neutral. The agent is credit constrained
so that payments from the principal to the agent must be non-negative in all
periods; otherwise the solution to the contracting problem would be trivial: sell
the project to the agent. (In fact, the agent could be allowed to be risk averse.
The key assumption for our analysis is that the agent’s value from contracting
is positive, which here is a result of limited liability.) Successful completion of
the project is worth v ≥ 0 to the principal. The principal and the agent have
respective discount rates of rP and rA.
When the agent exerts effort a within a time interval of (infinitesimal) length
∆, the probability of a success is a∆. Hence we suppose that project completion
follows a Poisson process in which the agent controls the arrival rate through
her choice of effort. The cost of such effort is c(a)∆. We make the following
assumption about the cost function.
Assumption 1 1. c′(a) > 0, c′′(a) > 0 and c′′′(a) ≥ 0 for all a ≥ 0.3
2. c(0) = 0 and lima→∞ c
′(a) =∞.
Part 1 of the assumption is fairly standard, requiring the cost function to
be increasing, convex and (even stronger) have a positive third derivative. The
main substance of part 2 is to rule out fixed costs, so that the agent can ensure
zero costs per period by exerting no effort. The assumption is satisfied e.g., for
quadratic costs: c(a) = γa2, where γ > 0.
We now describe the dynamic game between the principal and the agent. At
the beginning of each period t, the principal promises to pay wst if the project is
completed and wft if it remains incomplete. All past promises by the principal are
observable but, as previously stated, the agent’s effort choices are unobservable.
Since the game ends once the project is completed (and this is verifiable), the
only relevant histories in the game are those conditional on the project not being
completed. We denote a history up to period t by ht ≡ (ws0, w
f
0 , ..., w
s
t−1, w
f
t−1).
3As is often the case for clear comparative statics with dynamics or with uncertainty, we
require the condition c′′′ ≥ 0.
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The set of histories up to period t is denoted by Ht. The set of all histories
of all lengths is H ≡ ∪tH
t. A wage setting strategy w for the principal is a pair
of functions (ws,wf ) where ws : H → R and wf : H → R. A continuation wage
setting strategy after history ht is denoted by w|ht . Since the agent chooses his
effort in period t only after observing the promised wages, his strategy is denoted
by a where4 a : H → R. A continuation strategy for the agent after history ht
and current wage offer wt is denoted by a|(ht,wt).
Let τ denote the random number of time intervals of length ∆ after which
the project is completed. The expected payoffs for the principal and agent are
then
V (w,a) ≡ Eτ
(1− rP∆)τ (v − ws(hτ ))− τ−1∑
j=0
(1− rP∆)
jwf (hj)

=
∞∑
i=1
( i−1∏
j=0
(1− a(hj)∆)
)
×(1− rP∆)ia(hi)∆(v − ws(hi))− i−1∑
j=0
(1− rP∆)
jwf (hj)
 , (1)
W (w,a) ≡ Eτ
(1− rA∆)τws(hτ )− τ∑
j=0
(1− rA∆)
jc(a(hj))∆ +
τ−1∑
j=0
(1− rA∆)
jwf (hj)

=
∞∑
i=0
( i−1∏
j=0
(1− a(hj)∆)
)
×(1− rA∆)i(a(hi)∆ws(hi)− c(a(hj))∆) + i−1∑
j=0
(1− rA∆)
jwf (hj)
 .
(2)
While we have described the game in discrete time in order to make clear
its dynamic structure, we shall throughout concentrate on the continuous-time
limit of the game, as ∆→ 0.
3 The efficient solution
We first consider the benchmark case in which there is no principal-agent prob-
lem i.e., a single individual chooses effort levels over time to maximise expected
surplus. The problem will not be entirely standard, however: in order to reflect
the analysis in the next Section, where the principal and the agent may have
4Since the stage game is in extensive form, and the principal moves first, the relevant history
for the agent in period t also contains wt and is thus h
t+1.
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different discount rates, we will apply the discount rate rP to the flow of ben-
efits, and the rate rA to the flow of costs. We will also deal directly with the
continuous-time limit for the single individual’s problem, since in this optimal
control problem, issues of timing within the period do not arise.
Consider a profile of actions {a(t)}∞t=0. Given this profile, the probability
that the project has not been completed by time t is
A(t) ≡
∫ t
0
a(s)ds. (3)
The single individual’s problem is then to choose actions {a(t)}∞t=0 to maximise∫ ∞
0
e−A(t)[e−rP ta(t)v − e−rAtc(a(t))]dt (4)
subject to equation (3) and a non-negativity constraint on the effort level in each
period i.e., a(t) ≥ 0 for all t.
The optimization problem here can be considered as one where the principal
and the agent contract in period zero and all future effort choices are contractible.
(In order to maintain comparability to the equilibrium solutions presented in
later Sections, there are no direct intertemporal transfers between the agent and
the principal.) This results in a concave optimal control problem that can be
analyzed by a routine application of Pontryagins maximum principle. Doing
so shows that the single individual’s optimal choice of action must satisfy the
differential equation
c′′(a(t))a˙(t) = −rP ve
(rA−rP )t + (rA + a(t))c
′(a(t))− c(a(t)) (5)
for all t ≥ 0, and a(t) ≥ 0. (Here, a˙(t) denotes the time derivative of a(t).)
We shall see in the next Section that the principal-agent problem is non-
trivial only when rP ≤ rA; so we assume this for the rest of this Section. In
order to characterise the solution, we first show in the next Lemma that any
efficient solution must have effort non-decreasing over time.
Lemma 1 In any efficient solution, a˙(t) ≥ 0 for all t.
Proof. Suppose that at some time t, a˙(t) < 0. Since rP ve
(rA−rP )t is increasing
in t, and (rA + a)c
′(a) − c(a) is increasing in a (from the assumed properties
of the cost function), it must be that a˙(s) < 0 for all s > t. Moreover, since
−rP ve
(rA−rP )t is strictly negative, there must be some time τ at which a(t) = 0
for all t ≥ τ . This cannot be optimal, however: such a path is strictly dominated
by an alternative path that is the same at all times prior to τ , but sets some
strictly positive action for times subsequent to τ . 
With this Lemma, we can then describe the efficient choice of action.
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Proposition 1 When rP = rA = r > 0, the efficient action is constant, and
given by the solution to
(r + a∗)c′(a∗)− c(a∗) = rv. (6)
When rP < rA, the efficient action grows at least exponentially over time.
Proof. When rP = rA = r > 0, equation (5) becomes
c′′(a(t))a˙(t) = −rv + (r + a(t))c′(a(t)) − c(a(t)).
First note that there is clearly a unique solution to equation (6), since the left-
hand side of the equation is increasing in a. Suppose now that a(0) > a∗. In this
case, the differential equation implies that a˙(t) > 0 for all t, and hence that a(t)
grows without bound. This cannot be optimal. If a(0) < a∗, a˙(0) < 0, which
cannot be optimal, by Lemma 1. Hence a(0) = a∗, and consequently a(t) = a∗
for all t, in this case.
Now consider the case where rP < rA. Suppose that at any time t, a˙(t) = 0.
Equation (5) implies that a˙(s) < 0 for all s > t, which cannot be optimal, by
Lemma 1. Hence a˙(t) > 0 for all t. But then equation (5) implies that
(rA + a(t))c
′(a(t)) − c(a(t)) > rP ve
(rA−rP )t,
which establishes the claim. 
Some intuition is apparent from equation (6), if we re-write it v = c′(a) +
(ac′(a)− c(a))/r. The static first-order condition is v = c′(a); the term (ac′(a)−
c(a))/r expresses the opportunity cost of effort today, when there is always the
option of reducing current effort and completing the project in the future.
The dynamics of the efficient effort when the discount rates are not equal is
of some interest. When costs are discounted more than benefits, effort is back-
loaded; the extent of the backloading depends on the relative discount factor
e−(rA−rP )t. We shall see that this action profile is in sharp contrast to those that
arise when a principal must contract with an agent.
We illustrate these solutions using a specific (quadratic) functional form for
the cost function: c(a) = γa2; and specific parameter values: v = γ = 1;
rp = rA = 0.05 in the equal discount rate case; and rP = 0.02 and rA = 0.05 in
the unequal case. With this set-up, a∗ = 0.1135 and the efficient value, which is
given by
U∗ =
a∗v − c(a∗)
r + a∗
is equal to 0.6154.5 The dynamics of the efficient effort when the discount rates
5In the quadratic case,
a∗ =
−r +
√
r2 + 3rv/γ
3
and
U∗ =
(
r +
√
r (r + 3 v/γ)
)(
r −
√
r (r + 3 v/γ) + 3 v/γ
)
3(2r +
√
r (r + 3 v/γ))
.
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Figure 1: The efficient effort with unequal discount rates; v = γ = 1; rP =
0.02, rA = 0.05
are not equal are illustrated in figure 1. The efficient value in this case is 0.7739.6
4 Full commitment
We now turn to the analysis of the principal-agent problem with moral hazard.
We start by considering in this Section the case of full commitment, where the
principal commits at the outset to a path of wages w(ht) = wt = (w
s
t , w
f
t ) for all
histories ht ∈ ∪th
t. This corresponds to the Stackelberg solution of the sequential
game where the principal first chooses a strategy once and for all at the beginning
of the game, and the agent best-responds against this strategy. Most papers on
dynamic incentive provision characterize the solution of this problem. We will
derive this solution in some detail, since it will turn out that there is a close
relation between the full commitment solution and the best sequentially rational
equilibrium that construct in Section 5.
We start the analysis by distinguishing between two cases. When the agent
is more patient than the principal, the principal can induce the agent to take an
arbitrarily high effort with an arbitrarily low cost. Because of the differences in
the discount factors, a wage payment with a fixed present value to the agent is
less costly to the principal (in present value terms) when the payment is delayed.
So in this case, the principal can promise a high reward for success at negligible
6There is an analytical solution for the optimal effort in this case, involving Bessel functions.
Numerical integration is used to calculated the value. The Matlab programme used for this
and other calculations in the paper are available on request.
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cost through delayed payments. Hence in order to make the problem non-trivial,
we assume from now on that rA ≥ rP .
The following result will prove helpful in expressing the incentives that hold
in the full commitment solution.
Proposition 2 In the full commitment solution, the principal sets the wage in
the event that the project is not completed, wft , at 0 for all t.
Proof. First note that it is obvious that any wages paid after a success can be
paid immediately after that success: any delayed payment can be replaced by an
immediate payment that is equivalent in net present value terms. Now consider
an optimal wage path {ŵt}
∞
t=0 and fix the best response path of the agent {ât}
∞
t=0
against this wage path. There are two cases to consider, depending on whether
the principal’s value is (weakly) decreasing or increasing in the agent’s choice of
effort. Let T ≡ {t |Vt is weakly decreasing in at for {ŵt}
∞
t=0 and {âs}s 6=t}. Then
for all t ∈ T , the principal increases her payoff by setting w˜ft = w˜
s
t = 0. This
increase is strict if ŵft > 0 for some t ∈ T .
Next consider t /∈ T . We claim that the principal also sets optimally ŵft = 0.
Suppose not i.e., suppose in some period t ∈ T , ŵft > 0. If ŵ
s
t ≤ ŵ
f
t , then the
optimal effort choice is 0 and the equilibrium payoff to the principal is negative
and setting wft = w
s
t = 0 is a profitable deviation. Suppose next that ŵ
s
t > ŵ
f
t >
0. A deviation to w˜st = ŵ
s
t − ŵ
f
t , w˜
f
t = 0 leaves the incentives for optimal effort
choice in period t unchanged, noting that future wage offers by the principal are
unaffected by this (since we are dealing with the full commitment case). This
deviation reduces the wage payments of the principal by ŵft > 0 and hence is
clearly profitable. 
To see why Proposition 2 holds, suppose to the contrary that wft > 0 at some
time t. The principal could then reduce wst and w
f
t by the same amount, leaving
all other wages constant. This has the effect of increasing effort in earlier stages
while reducing the principals expected payment, and so must be better for the
principal. For the remainder of this Section, we shall therefore just refer to the
wage profile {ws}
∞
s=0 set by the principal, specifying the payment received by
the agent depending on when the project is completed.
The next step for the analysis is to capture succinctly the incentives of the
principal and the agent. First note that there is an implicit state variable in the
game: whether the project has been completed or not. But since the game is
over as soon as the project is completed, we do not emphasise this state variable.
We can therefore consider time as the only state variable, and write the agent’s
problem in the following recursive way:
Wt = max
a
{
a∆wt − c(a)∆ + (1− a∆)(1− rA∆)Wt+∆}. (7)
Here, Wt is the agent’s value function at time t, facing the wage schedule set by
the principal, {ws}
∞
s=0. This value has three terms. The first is the expected flow
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payoff of the agent: with probability a∆ the project is completed and the agent
receives the current wage wt. The agent incurs a flow cost c(a)∆ regardless of
whether his efforts are successful or not. Finally, if the project is not completed
(with probability 1− a∆), the game moves to the next period; the agent’s value
is then Wt+∆, which is discounted with the factor 1− rA∆.
Our next step is to consider the limit of the problem as ∆ → 0. In this
Section, we will take a heuristic approach to the continuous-time limits; in the
Appendix, we take limits more rigorously, showing that they do indeed converge
to the expressions derived here. When we take the limits, we denote the resulting
variables at real time t by a(t),W (t) etc.7
Heuristically, we use a first-order Taylor series expansion and let ∆→ 0 to ar-
rive at a continuous-time Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation: rAW (t) =
maxa
{
a(w(t) −W (t)) − c(a) + W˙ (t)
}
, where W˙ (t) ≡ dW (t)/dt. Since c(·) is
strictly convex and any other term involving a is linear in a, the first-order
condition is necessary and sufficient for the agent’s optimal action:
w(t) = c′(a(t)) +W (t). (8)
That is, the agent equates the marginal benefit from exerting effort (gaining
the wage w(t)) with the marginal cost, which has two parts: the marginal cost
of effort, c′(a), and the opportunity cost of succeeding, which is the foregone
continuation value W (t). Substituting into the HJB equation gives
W˙ (t) = rAW (t)−
(
a(t)c′(a(t))− c(a(t))
)
. (9)
Equation (9) describes how the agent’s value must evolve in equilibrium.
Using the first-order condition of the agent, we can write the principal’s HJB
equation in terms of choosing a(t) as:
V (t) = max
a
{
a(t)(v − w(t)dt + (1− a(t)dt)(1 − rpdt)V (t+ dt)
}
.
The interpretation of this equation is very similar to that of the agent’s Bell-
man equation. Using equation (9) we have the following HJB equation for the
principal:
rPV (t) = max
a
{
a(t)(v − V (t)−W (t)− c′(a(t))) + V˙ (t)
}
.
When re-arranged, this becomes
V˙ (t) = (rP + a(t))V (t)− a(t)
(
v −W (t)− c′(a(t))
)
. (10)
Equation (10) describes how the principal’s value must evolve in equilibrium.
7In other words, a(t) = lim∆→0 ak(∆,t) along any convergent subsequence where we take
k(∆, t) = min {k′ |k′∆ ≥ t} . Similarly for the other variables w(t),W (t) and V (t).
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We are now ready to write the full commitment problem in an optimal control
formulation, where the objective is to maximize the principal’s initial value, but
with the continuation values of the principal and the agent as state variables:8
max
{a(t),W (0)}
V (0) subject to
V˙ (t) = (rP + a(t))V (t)− a(t)
(
v −W (t)− c′(a(t))
)
, (11)
W˙ (t) = rAW (t)−
(
a(t)c′(a(t)− c(a(t))
)
.
There are implicit constraints on the state variables V and W , which both must
be non-negative. There is a similar non-negativity constraint on the principal’s
control variable: the agent’s effort level a(t). We will not incorporate these
constraints explicitly in the problem, but will ensure that they are satisfied when
characterizing the optimal solution.
By Pontryagin’s maximum principle, there must exist continuous functions
(the co-state multipliers) attached to the first and the second constraint respec-
tively, denoted by λ(t) and µ(t), so that when the Hamiltonian
H(t) ≡ λ(t)
(
(rP + a(t))V (t)− a(t)(v −W (t)− c
′(a(t)))
)
+ µ(t)
(
rAW (t)− (a(t)c
′(a(t)) − c(a(t)))
)
is defined, the necessary conditions for optimality are given by:
µ(0) = 0; (12)
∂H
∂a
= −λ
(
v −W − V − c′(a)− ac′′(a)
)
− µac′′(a) = 0; (13)
λ˙ = (rP + a)λ−
∂H
∂V
= 0; (14)
µ˙ = (rP + a)µ−
∂H
∂W
= (rP − rA + a)µ− aλ. (15)
In these conditions, we have suppressed the time indices for notational conve-
nience. We have also expressed the problem in current values terms, as the last
two conditions (14) and (15) make clear. Also, in those conditions, the princi-
pal’s effective discount rate is rP + a, since in any interval [t, t + dt), there is a
probability a(t)dt that the agent completes the project and the problem stops.
There is also a transversality condition; the form of this condition depends
on whether it is optimal for the principal to stop the problem (i.e., fire the agent)
in finite time; or whether an infinite horizon is optimal. Our first result in this
Section considers this question, showing that it is not optimal to choose a finite
stopping time.
8An alternative approach is to use the method developed by Spear and Srivastava (1987) and
Phelan and Townsend (1991) and write the optimal contract in terms of the agent’s continuation
value as the state variable. In earlier versions of this paper, we used this second approach. Both
approaches will give the same answer, but it turns out that using the optimal control approach
makes comparison to sequentially rational equilibria (see Section 5) easier.
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Proposition 3 A finite stopping time is not optimal in the full commitment
problem when rP ≤ rA.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Proposition 3 shows that sufficient incentives can be provided to the agent
by reducing his wage over time, without resorting to firing him. The result will
allow us to establish unambiguously the dynamics of the optimal contract. The
economic reasoning behind the result is as follows. Suppose that there is a time,
T say, when the agent’s wage and hence effort falls to zero. Now suppose that
the principal raises the wage at T by a very small amount dw > 0. To fix
ideas, suppose that the cost function is quadratic, taking the form c(a) = a2/2.
The increase in wage at time T has a first-order effect on the agent’s effort at
T . Since the wage after T is zero, the agent chooses effort a(T ) = dw. Hence
W (T ) = 0.5(dw)2∆. But of course, the principal has to be concerned about
the incentive effect on the agent at times before T . This effect is second-order,
however. The agent’s Bellman equation an instant before T is
W (T − dt) = max
a
{aw(T −∆)∆− 0.5a2∆+ (1− a∆)(1− rA∆)(dw)
2∆}.
Hence the agent’s optimal choice of action at T − ∆ is given by w(T − ∆) −
a − (dw)2 = 0, and so the incentive effect of a positive wage at T can be made
arbitrarily small.9
So, we know that the principal will never fire the agent. We shall now
show that the dynamics of the full commitment solution are such that once
the agent’s value starts to increase, it must subsequently always increase. (That
is, if W˙ (t) > 0 at some t, then W˙ (t′) >0 for all t′ > t.) But this is inconsistent
with the transversality condition when the horizon is infinite, which essentially
requires the optimal path to be bounded. This implies that the agent’s value
must be decreasing along the optimal path. The result that we find is (as we
discuss in the introduction) similar to existing results from e.g., the optimal
unemployment insurance literature. Nevertheless, we shall spend some time de-
riving the dynamics, for two reasons. First, and less importantly, our model is
somewhat different from those in that literature, and so we have to establish the
result for our setting. Secondly, and more importantly, a detailed understanding
of the dynamics will prove very useful in the next Section, where we derive more
novel results relating to sequentially rational equilibria.
To show this, we first state the appropriate transversality condition in this
case. If V ∗(t) and W ∗(t) are optimal trajectories of the state variables, then
lim
t→∞
λ(t)
(
V ∗(t)− V (t)
)
≤ 0, lim
t→∞
µ(t)
(
W ∗(t)−W (t)
)
≤ 0
9This intuition relies on the feature that c′(0) = 0, while the result does not require this.
Note that we havev > c′(0) in all interesting cases. To carry the intuition over, therefore, just
interpret v as being net of c′(0). We thank a referee for pointing out this issue to us.
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for all feasible trajectories V (t) and W (t). (See Kamihigashi (2001).) Less
formally, the principal cannot gain by deviating from the optimal path given by
V ∗(t) and W ∗(t) and never returning to it. This is clearly a necessary condition
for optimality. Equally clearly, the optimal states must be bounded: the values
to the principal and the agent cannot grow indefinitely, nor can they become
negative. The implication for the problem at hand is that the system must
converge to a steady state in which the controls and states are stationary and
bounded.
We already have expressions for the dynamics of V and W , as well as the co-
state variables. We now derive the differential equation for the optimal control
a. To simplify the derivation, we set λ equal to −1; this is without loss of
generality.10 Then, differentiate the first-order condition (13) with respect to
time: (
c
′′
(a) + (µ+ 1)(c
′′
(a) + ac
′′′
(a))
)
a˙ = −V˙ − W˙ − ac′′(a)µ˙.
We establish in the proof of Proposition 4 (see the appendix) that the Hamilto-
nian H is equal to zero along the optimal path. This means that we can write V˙
as µW˙ . Doing this, and using equations (9) and (15) to substitute in for W˙ (t)
and µ˙(t), gives the following differential equation for the dynamics of a(t):(
c′′(a) + (µ + 1)(c′′(a) + ac′′′(a))
)
a˙
= −(µ+ 1)
(
rAW − (ac
′(a)− c(a)) + a2c′′(a)
)
− a2c′′(a)(rP − rA)µ. (16)
We are now able to characterise the dynamics of the optimal commitment
contract when rA ≥ rP . To do so, define the myopic effort level a
M by v −
c′(aM ) − aMc′′(aM ) = 0). This is the effort level that would occur if both the
principal and the agent ignored any continuation of the game beyond the current
period. Then the marginal benefit from effort is v; the static marginal cost is
c′(a); to this static marginal cost is added an agency cost, captured by ac′′(a).
Hence the myopic effort level is less than the static effort aS that would occur
in the single-agent problem, defined by v = c′(aS).
Proposition 4 In the full commitment solution when rA ≥ rP , the agent’s con-
tinuation value W (t), the optimal wage profile w(t), and the agent’s effort level
a(t) are all decreasing over time. If rP = rA, then the continuation value, wage
and effort levels converge to zero. If rP < rA, then the wage and effort levels
converge to strictly positive levels. The initial effort level, and hence all levels,
are below the myopic effort aM .
10λ must be a constant, from equation (14)). Clearly, then, the value of λ can be set equal
to any constant; the levels of other variables in the problem are then defined relative to this
arbitrary choice of the value of λ. We choose λ = −1 as this turns out to be analytically
convenient.
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aˆ aM
Figure 2: Phase diagram for the problem with full commitment with rP = rA;
v = g = 1; rP = rA = 0.05
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the proof of the Proposition. The phase diagrams
involve two curves. The first, denotedWµ=0 = 0(a), are the pairs of (a,W ) along
which the multiplier µ attached to the state variable W is zero. (See equation
A.24 in the Appendix.) Since the initial value W (0) is freely chosen, µ(0) = 0,
and the optimal path must start somewhere on this curve. The second curve,
denoted WW˙=0 = 0(a), are the pairs of (a,W ) along which the state variable W
is stationary. (See equation (9).) Below this curve, W is decreasing; above it, it
is increasing. Since proposition 4 tells us that W (t) is decreasing over time, we
know that the optimal path must lie entirely below the WW˙=0 = 0(a) curve.
In fact, in the shaded area in the figures, both a˙ and W˙ are non-positive.
Moreover, the optimal initial point must lie on the portion of the Wµ=0 = 0(a)
curve that is to the south-east of the WW˙=0 = 0(a) curve. Any optimal path
from that portion of the curve must move into the shaded area; hence a˙ and W˙
must be non-positive along the entire path. Possible steady states are marked
with a dot; clearly, they must lie on the curve along which W˙ = 0. If rP = rA,
then only one steady state exists: the origin, with a = W = 0. Otherwise, two
steady states exist (as shown in the figure). The optimal path converges to the
steady state with a = W = 0, if rP ≥ rA. Otherwise, it converges to a steady
state with strictly positive levels of a and W .
These results are reminiscent of those in the literature on optimal unemploy-
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Figure 3: Phase diagram for the problem with full commitment with rP < rA;
v = g = 1; rP = 0.02, rA = 0.05
ment literature (reviewed in the introduction). In particular, the idea that the
principal uses a declining wage to incentivize the agent can be found in e.g.,
Shavell and Weiss (1979). The mechanics are somewhat different here, however;
and the analysis here is somewhat more general, involving different discount
rates. Because the agent has increasing marginal cost of effort, he looks to
smooth his effort over time: to substitute away from current effort toward future
effort. Limited liability means that the agent earns positive rents from the con-
tract. The principal uses the dynamics of these rents to provide the agent with
incentives to exert effort. In particular, the full commitment contract ensures
that the agent’s continuation value is decreasing in equilibrium. By these means,
the principal gives the agent incentives to exert current effort. The continuation
value is driven downwards by a decreasing wage; the agent’s effort also decreases
over time.
The profile of effort should be contrasted to the efficient solution analysed in
the previous Section. There, we showed that the efficient effort either is constant
(when rP = rA) or grows exponentially (when rP < rA).
The Proposition distinguishes between two cases: when the principal and
agent are equally patient (rP = rA), and when the agent is more impatient. In
the former case, in the full commitment solution, the agent’s wage and action
go to zero in the long run. In the latter case, the wage and action converge
towards strictly positive levels. The intuition for this difference lies in how the
principal can reward the agent for effort in a way that matches their relative time
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Figure 4: Numerical solutions for the full commitment case; g = 1; rP =
0, 02, rA = 0.05
preferences. When the agent is less patient than the principal (rA > rP ), the
principal can allow the agent a positive value in the long-run, without affecting
(too much) incentives towards current effort. And by allowing the long-run value
to be positive, the principal ensures that the agent’s effort is always bounded
away from zero. For the more patient principal, the latter is important.
Figure 4 shows numerical solutions for the full commitment problem for two
different values of the model parameter v.11 When v = 1, for example, the
initial effort a(0) exerted by the agent is 0.07956. The equilibrium effort declines
monotonically over time, until it reaches its steady state value of 0.02832. The
agent’s equilibrium value declines monotonically from W (0) = 0.06115 to its
steady state value of 0.01586. The principal’s value (not shown in the figure)
declines from V (0) = 0.6195 to its steady state value of 0.5324. When v = 2,
values and actions are higher (which makes sense), but show the same dynamics.
Figure 5 shows the equilibrium values over time, figure 6 the equilibrium action
and wage over time.
The final result in this Section examines whether the agent completes the
project in finite time.
11We have assumed a quadratic cost function: c(a) = γa2, where γ is set at 1. The discount
rates in this figure are rA = 5%, rP = 2%. Details of the numerical work, including the Matlab
code, are available from the authors on request.
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Figure 5: Numerical solutions for values, in the full commitment case; v = g =
1; rP = 0, 02, rA = 0.05
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Figure 6: Numerical solutions for the action and wage, in the full commitment
case; v = g = 1; rP = 0, 02, rA = 0.05
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Proposition 5 When the principal faces an impatient agent (rP < rA), the
project is completed in finite time almost surely. When the principal faces an
equally patient agent (rP = rA), if the cost function is not too convex (i.e., if
c(a) = O(a4−β) for some β < 2), then the probability that the project is completed
in finite time is less than one. Otherwise, if β ≥ 2, then the project is completed
in finite time almost surely.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The Proposition follows immediately when the agent is relatively impatient,
since his effort is always strictly positive. The proof is more subtle when the
agent is relatively patient, since in this case, his effort declines to zero. The
proof relies on looking at the rate of decline of the agent’s effort as the steady
state is approached. The intuition is that if costs are highly convex, it is costly for
the principal to induce the agent to have big differences in his effort across time.
As a consequence, the agent’s effort decreases relatively slowly in equilibrium (at
least near the steady state). This means that
∫∞
o
a(t)dt is unbounded and so the
project completes almost surely. But when costs are not too convex, it is not too
costly for the principal to induce high current effort and lower future effort. This
means that the agent’s effort decreases relatively quickly in equilibrium (near the
steady state); consequently,
∫∞
o
a(t)dt is bounded and the probability that the
project completes is less than 1. As we noted in the introduction, certain projects
(e.g., the nuclear power plant in Olkiluoto, Finland) can experience significant
delay; time will tell if this particular project is ever completed.
5 Wages without commitment
In the previous Section, we assumed that the principal can commit to an entire
path of future wages. While full commitment is the standard assumption in
static mechanism design problems, relaxing this assumption is quite natural in
dynamic settings. When the agent is as patient as the principal, we have seen
that the optimal commitment wage decreases towards zero. This implies that the
optimal effort exerted by the agent and the continuation value to the principal
also converge to zero. In these circumstances, the principal would be tempted
to offer a temporary bonus to the agent for completing the task.
In this Section, we make the opposite extreme assumption on commitment:
the principal can promise only temporary spot wages in each period that condi-
tion on whether the project was successfully completed. (More precisely, we re-
quire that all continuation wage offer strategies, on and off the equilibrium path,
are best responses to the agent’s strategy.) In order to analyze the principal-
agent problem in this case, we must make use of the full machinery of repeated
extensive-form games to pin down the principal’s and the agent’s behaviour after
all possible wage offers.
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Even though the interaction between the principal and the agent induces a
stochastic game between the parties, the principal has still the power to set in-
centives for the agent through the wage offers. In the absence of commitment, the
game has a non-degenerate set of equilibria. In this Section, we characterise the
set of all sequentially rational equilibria through an optimal penal code resem-
bling the construction in Abreu (1988). We also compute the best sequentially
rational equilibrium from the principal’s point of view. This choice reflects the
common convention from the literature on mechanism design, that the designer
also proposes the equilibrium to be played. Later in this Section, we consider
renegotiation between the principal and the agent.
A sequentially rational equilibrium in our game is a pair (w,a) such that
w|ht is optimal given a|(ht,wt) for all (ht,wt), and a|(ht,wt)is optimal given w|ht
and wt for all (h
t, wt). Since the underlying contracting game is stationary,
in the sense that the continuation game after each history (conditional on no
success) is strategically equivalent to the original game, we may view the set of
equilibrium continuation wage setting strategies in a recursive manner. The set
of sequentially rational equilibrium strategies does not depend on ht. We denote
the set of equilibrium strategies by E . Then every equilibrium continuation
strategy (w,a) ∈ E after history ht can be written as12
(w|ht ,a|(ht,wt))= ((w
s(ht),wf (ht),a(ht, wst , w
f
t )), (ŵ,â)) for some (ŵ,â) ∈ E .
Our task is to characterize pairs (V (w,a),W (w,a)) of payoffs induced by some
(w,a) ∈ E .
5.1 The worst sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal
In order to identify the worst equilibrium for the principal, we start by showing
that the game has a unique stationary sequentially rational equilibrium, in which
the principal offers the same wage contracts in all periods and the agent condi-
tions his current effort choice on the current wage offers and the stationary wage
strategy for the future periods. (In notation, a stationary equilibrium is such
that wf (ht),ws(ht) and a(ht) are independent of ht.) We then show that this
stationary equilibrium yields the lowest payoff to the principal of all sequentially
rational equilibria.
Proposition 6 The game has a unique stationary equilibrium where ws(ht) =
wSR > 0, and wf (ht) = 0 for all ht and histories and a(ht, wt) = a
SR(ht, wt) > 0
after all histories ht where ws(ht) = wSR > 0 and wf (ht) = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
12Since our stage game is in extensive form, sequential rationality also requires that for any
wt, the continuation (ŵ,a) constitutes an equilibrium in the game.
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Denote the payoffs in this equilibrium by V SR and W SR. Our second result
shows that the principal’s payoff in the (unique) stationary equilibrium is the
lowest payoff of any equilibrium in the set of sequentially rational equilibria.
In the course of proving this result, we show that all wage paths that generate
higher payoffs to the principal than the stationary equilibrium can be supported
as sequentially rational equilibria. This turns out to be quite useful for charac-
terizing the best sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal. In particular,
we will be able to use the laws of motion (equations (9) and (10)) established in
the previous Section to describe the sequentially rational equilibrium path with
the highest payoff to the principal.
Proposition 7 All sequentially rational equilibria induce a payoff of at least
V SR to the principal.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
It should be noted that even though the worst equilibrium payoff to the
principal can be supported as a stationary equilibrium, the same is not true
of the best payoff. In the proof of Proposition 7, a key step establishes that a
relatively high equilibrium continuation payoff to the principal can be reduced by
an essentially unconditional monetary transfer from the principal to the agent.
To get a similar mechanism to work for the best equilibria from the principal’s
point of view, we would need a mechanism that transfers continuation value
unconditionally from the agent to the principal. This is, however, ruled out by
our assumption of limited liability.
5.2 The best sequentially rational equilibrium for the principal
The problem of characterizing the best sequentially rational equilibrium for the
principal is conceptually similar to the full commitment problem in the previous
Section. By Lemma 3 in the Appendix, the principal can implement all wage and
effort paths that satisfy the requirement that V (t) ≥ V SR for all t. The strategies
supporting these equilibria take a simple form. As long as the principal has
offered wages on the equilibrium path, both players continue to choose actions
on the path. If the principal deviates at any point, then play reverts to the
stationary equilibrium. Since this is the worst equilibrium for the principal, it
ensures that no deviation takes place.
Note also that, in common with the full commitment solution, no payment
is made at any point on the equilibrium path of the best sequentially rational
equilibrium at which the project has not been completed.13
13The argument is very similar: suppose to the contrary that wf (ht) > 0 for some history ht
on equilibrium path. Then, using a previous argument, reduce ws(ht) and wf (ht) by the same
amount, leaving all other wages constant. This has the effect of increasing effort in earlier stages
while reducing the principal’s expected payment. To complete the argument for the sequentially
rational case, note that the punishment path following any deviation by the principal is the
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It is easy, therefore, to express the maximization problem of the principal
in a manner analogous to the previous Section. Consider then the following
constrained optimization problem:
SR : max
{a(t),W (0)}
V (0) subject to
V˙ (t) = (rP + a(t))V (t)− a(t)
(
v −W (t)− c′(a(t))
)
, (17)
W˙ (t) = rAW (t)−
(
a(t)c′(a(t)− c(a(t))
)
.
V (t) ≥ V SR, for all t.
If the last inequality constraint is not binding, then the problem is identical to
the one solved in previously. Since the constraint binds, there is a finite T such
that V (t) = V SR for all t ≥ T . The following Lemma determines the agent’s
continuation payoff at T . In the Lemma, and the rest of the section, we letW be
the lowest payoff to the agent in any sequentially rational equilibrium. (Clearly,
W exists and is well-defined.)
Lemma 2 The best sequentially rational equilibrium payoff to the principal is
obtained by setting W (T ) =W .
Proof. See the Appendix. 
Hence we have argued that the solution to SR satisfies the state constraints
(V (T ),W (T )) =
(
V SR,W
)
. The state evolution equations in SR determine the
values V (t) and W (t) for any given path of actions {a(t)}. Hence the problem
of finding the best sequentially rational equilibrium, from the principal’s point
of view, can be written as one of finding the optimal sequence of actions and an
optimal time T when the constraint is hit; that is,
SR : max
{a(t),T}
V (0) subject to
V˙ (t) = (rP + a(t))V (t)− a(t)
(
v −W (t)− c′(a(t))
)
, (18)
W˙ (t) = rAW (t)−
(
a(t)c′(a(t) − c(a(t))
)
.
V (T ) = V SR,W (T ) =W.
The implied laws of motion up to time T in this best sequentially rational
equilibrium satisfy the differential equations derived for the full commitment
solution in the previous Section. Hence the qualitative properties of the wage
and action sequences are similar. We summarize the findings in this subsection
in the following Proposition:
stationary equilibrium, in which wf = 0 following all histories: see Proposition 6. Hence we
can conclude that wf (ht) = 0 in the best sequentially rational equilibrium for all ht, on (and
off) the equilibrium path.
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Proposition 8 The action path with the highest expected payoff to the principal
over all sequentially rational equilibria is given by the solution to SR. Hence the
equilibrium wage, action and values all decrease before time T . From T onwards,
the continuation payoffs are given by (V SR,W ).
5.3 Renegotiation-proof equilibria
We now consider equilibrium when renegotiation of the initial contract is possi-
ble. Since there are different definitions for renegotiation-proofness in infinite-
horizon games, we must select a concept to use. The weakest notion of renegotiation-
proofness is defined in Farrell and Maskin (1989). Since the wage offer w cur-
rently on table is a part of the payoff relevant description of the continuation
game, we must consider different histories up to w when computing the agent’s
continuation strategy. An equilibrium (w,a) ∈ E is weakly renegotiation-proof
(WRP) if for all (h,w), (h′ , w) ∈ H,
V (w|h,a|(h,w)) > V (w|h′ ,a|(h′,w)) ⇒W (w|h,a|(h,w)) < W (w|h′ ,a|(h′,w)),
W (w|h,a|(h,w)) > W (w|h′ ,a|(h′,w)) ⇒ V (w|h,a|(h,w)) < V (w|h′ ,a|(h′,w)).
Hence a sequentially rational equilibrium is weakly renegotiation-proof if no pair
of continuation payoffs (on or off the equilibrium path) is Pareto-dominated by
another pair of continuation payoffs.
Since the equilibrium payoffs of Proposition 8 to both the principal and the
agent are decreasing over time, this equilibrium is not renegotiation-proof. Nev-
ertheless, it is clear from the definition of weak renegotiation-proofness and the
characterization of sequentially rational equilibria in Lemma 3 in the Appendix
that there are many WRP equilibria. For example, the following construction
yields a WRP equilibrium with constant wage offers on the equilibrium path:
punish any deviation by the principal by switching to the continuation game in
which the unique stationary equilibrium of the game is played. Then any con-
stant wage offer w(ht) = w on the equilibrium path, with the agent choosing
the (stationary) action aBR(w) (where this notation denotes the agent’s best re-
sponse to the current and future constant wage offers w), together form a WRP
equilibrium of the game if V (w, a(w)) > V SR and W (w, aBR(w)) < W SR.
We close this Section by discussing the best WRP equilibrium from the prin-
cipal’s point of view. Since all continuation equilibria of a WRP equilibrium are
also WRP, it must be the case that in the best WRP equilibrium,
V (0) ≥ V (t) for all t ≥ 0.
In the Appendix, we show that in fact V (t) = V (0) and W (t) =W (0) for all t in
the WRP with the maximal payoff to the principal. Consider the problem where
the principal maximizes over constant wage sequences, taking into account that
the agent best-responds. In other words, let
wWRP ≡ argmax
w
V (w, aBR(w)).
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Proposition 9 The wage path with the highest expected payoff to the principal
over all weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria is given by the pair of strategies:
(w(t), a(w, t)) =
{
(wWRP , aBR(wWRP )) if w(t′) = wWRP for all t
′
≤ t,
(wSR, a(w,W SR)) otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
There are two parts to the argument. First, as we have already noted, it must
be that V (0) ≥ V (t) for all t in the best WRP equilibrium (since all continuation
equilibria of a WRP equilibrium are also WRP). Secondly, the proof shows that
there cannot be a time t such that V (t) < V (0): if there were, then a new contin-
uation game could be constructed, starting at the last time τ where V (τ) = V (0),
with a continuation value of V (τ) for the principal. But then the initial payoff
to the principal in this equilibrium would be greater than V (0): a contradic-
tion. Hence we find the typical property of renegotiation proof contracts: pay-
ments on the equilibrium path must be constant. See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
and MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) for similar results when contracts can be
“restarted”.
6 Conclusions
We have developed a model of dynamic moral hazard involving project com-
pletion which has allowed us to identify clearly the intertemporal incentives in-
volved. We show in the full commitment solution how the principal controls the
agent’s continuation value over time to provide the optimal dynamic incentives
for current effort. The long-run outcome of these dynamics is determined by
the relative discount rates of the principal and the agent. The principal never
fires the agent—despite the fact that, when the agent is relatively patient, there
may be a positive probability that the project is never completed. We also char-
acterise the set of sequentially rational equilibria, in particular identifying the
minimal and maximal payoffs of the principal, including when renegotiation is
possible.
The framework that we have developed is very tractable and offers a base
from which we intend to explore further dynamic incentives for this type of
problem.
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Appendix: Proofs
A formal derivation of the continuous-time limit for the full com-
mitment solution
Following Biais et al. (2007), we prove the convergence result in the dynamic
programming formulation with the agents’ promised utility as the state vari-
able. Consider the principal’s dynamic programming problem in the discrete-
time model with period length ∆:
V ∆(W ) = max
a∆,w∆,W∆−
{
∆a∆(v − w∆) + (1− a∆∆)(1− rP∆)V
∆(W∆− )
}
:= T∆V ∆
(A.19)
subject to
c′(a∆) ≥ w∆ −W∆− , c
′(a∆) = w∆ −W∆− if a
∆ > 0, (A.20)
W = ∆a∆w∆ − c(a∆)∆ + (1−∆a∆)(1− rA∆)W
∆
− , (A.21)
w∆,W∆− ≥ 0.
The notation here expresses the dependence of variables on the period length
∆; for example, a∆ is the equilibrium choice of effort. W∆− denotes the agent’s
value in the subsequent period.
Since each V is bounded above by v and bounded below by W , we see that
T∆ maps bounded functions into bounded functions. Since the constraint set is
a continuous correspondence of W , we see by Berges maximum theorem that T∆
maps continuous functions into continuous functions. By Blackwell’s sufficient
conditions, it is easy to check that T∆ is a contraction and hence has a unique
fixed point V ∆.
Consider next the following differential equation:
rpV (W ) = max
a
{a(v − c′(a)−W − V (W )) + (rAW − ac
′(a) + c(a))V ′(W )}.
(A.22)
The first-order condition for the maximization problem is (v − c′(a) − W −
V (W ))− ac′′(a)(V ′(W ) + 1) = 0, or
c′(a) + ac′′(a)(V ′(W ) + 1) = (v −W − V (W )). (A.23)
The problem is concave in a since (V ′(W ) + 1) ≥ 0.
Since the left-hand side of equation (A.23) is an unbounded increasing func-
tion in a and the right-hand side is a positive, a solution a(V (W ), V ′(W ),W )
exists. Substituting into equation (A.22), we get a non-linear ordinary differen-
tial equation. The phase diagram analysis shows that for each W0, we have a
unique value V0 = V (W0) such that the solution does not violate transversal-
ity conditions. We let V denote the unique feasible solution of the differential
equation.
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Our main goal in this Section is to show that V ∆ converges uniformly to V
as ∆→ 0. We start by analyzing T∆V. From equation (A.21), we get W − (1−
rA∆)W
∆
− = ∆a
∆c′(a∆)− c(a∆)∆ +∆2a∆rAW
∆
− , or
W∆− −W =
rA∆
(1− rA∆)
W −
∆a∆c′(a∆)− c(a∆)∆ +∆2a∆rAW
∆
−
(1− rA∆)
.
Since a∆ is bounded, we can ignore second-order terms as ∆→ 0.14 Thus
lim
∆→0
W∆− −W
∆
= rAW − a
∆c′(a∆)− c(a∆).
Since V is differentiable (by construction), we can write
T∆V (W ) = max
a∆,W∆−
{∆a∆(v − c′(a∆)−W − (rAW − a
∆c′(a∆)− c(a∆))∆)
+ (1− a∆∆)(1− rP∆)(V (W ) + (rAW − a
∆c′(a∆)− c(a∆))∆V ′(W ))}.
Ignoring second-order terms, we have
T∆V (W ) = max
a∆,w∆,W∆−
{∆a∆(v − c′(a∆)−W − V (W ))
+ V (W )− rP∆V (W ) + (rAW − a
∆c′(a∆)− c(a∆))∆V ′(W ).
Hence we have
max
W
∣∣T∆V (W )− V (W )∣∣
∆
= max
W
max
a∆
{a∆(v − c′(a∆)−W − V (W ))
− rPV (W ) + (rAW − a
∆c′(a∆)− c(a∆))V ′(W ).
But by the maximization problem in the continuous time differential equation
(A.22), the right-hand side is zero. Hence T∆V converges to V uniformly.
Notice next that d(V ∆, V ) ≤ d(V ∆, T∆V ) + d(T∆V, V ). Since T∆V ∆ = V ∆
and since T∆ is a contraction with factor (1 − rP∆), we have d(V
∆, T∆V ) ≤
(1 − rP∆)d(V
∆, V ). Putting these together gives d(V ∆, V ) ≤ d(T∆V, V )/rP∆,
so we have
lim
∆→0
d(V ∆, V ) ≤
1
rP
lim
∆→0
d(T∆V, V )
∆
= 0.
This completes the proof. 
14It is never optimal to induce the agent to choose an effort a where c′(a) > v, since it is
always possible to give the agent the same expected payoff in the form of an unconditional
transfer (i.e., one paid with or without success).
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Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose not i.e., suppose that it is optimal to choose a finite stopping time T .
We show that this leads to a contradiction.
Since W (T ) can be freely chosen by the principal (subject only to a non-
negativity constraint), it must be that µ(T ) = 0. Hence µ(0) = µ(T ) = 0
(recalling that W (0) also is freely chosen.) Equation (15) tells us that µ˙(0) =
−λa(0) and µ˙(T ) = −λa(T ). Since a(0) and a(T ) are non-negative and λ 6= 0,
this means that either µ˙(0) and µ˙(T ) are both positive or they are both negative
(determined by the sign of λ). We analyse fully the former case; the latter case
follows an identical argument. So, suppose µ˙(0) and µ˙(T ) are both positive (and
µ(0) = µ(T ) = 0). Since µ is a continuous function of t, there must be some
t∗ ∈ (0, T ) such that µ(t∗) = 0, and µ(·) is decreasing in t at this point. But the
latter cannot be the case, since equation (15) implies that µ˙(t∗) = −λa(t∗) ≥ 0.
Hence a contradiction has been established, and so a finite stopping time T
cannot be optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof uses a phase diagram in (a,W ) space. Three aspects need to be
analysed: the dynamics of a and W ; and the sign of V ′(·) in equilibrium.
The sign of W˙ is, from equation (9), determined by the sign of rAW−(ac
′(a)−
c(a)). This defines an upward-sloping function in (a,W ) space, given by
WW˙=0(a) ≡
ac′(a)− c(a)
rA
so that for W > (<)WW˙=0(a), W˙ > (<)0. Note that WW˙=0 = 0.
We now determine the sign of µ in equilibrium. We first establish that the
Hamiltonian H(t) is zero along the optimal path. Differentiation of H(t) gives
H˙(t) = −V¨ (t) + µ˙(t)W˙ (t) + µ(t)W¨ (t). (Here, a double dot denotes a second
derivative with respect to time.) After substitution of the expressions for the
various terms and simplification, we end up with H˙(t) = (rP + a(t))H(t). There
are then two possibilities: either H(t) > 0 or H(t) = 0 for all t. If the former,
then H(t) grows at least exponentially over time; this clearly cannot be the case
on any feasible path. Therefore H(t) = 0 for all t.
We can therefore write V˙ as µW˙ . Now use equations (10) and (13) to give
(rAW − ac
′(a) + c(a) + (a+ rP )ac
′′
(a))µ = rP (v −W − c
′(a)) − (a+ rP )ac
′′
(a).
(A.24)
Consider the left-hand side of this equation. From assumption 1, rAW −ac
′(a)+
c(a) + (a + rP )ac
′′
(a) ≥ 0 for all non-negative values of a and W . Hence the
sign of µ is determined by the sign of rP (v −W − c
′(a))− (a+ rP )ac
′′
(a). This
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defines a function in (a,W ) space, given by
Wµ=0(a) ≡ v − c
′(a)−
(
a+ rP
rP
)
ac
′′
(a).
This is a downward-sloping function, with an intercept Wµ=0(0) = v; it hits the
horizontal axis at an effort level aˆ strictly less than the myopic level aM (defined
by v − c′(aM ) − aMc
′′
(aM ) = 0). For values of (a,W ) lying below (above)
this function, µ is positive (negative); along the function, µ = 0. The function
WW˙=0(a) is, therefore, split into two portions by the function Wµ=0(a); call the
intersection point of the two functions (a∗,W ∗).
Now consider the dynamics of a, determined by equation (16). When µ = 0
(in particular, at the optimal initial choice of W ), the term on the left-hand side,
2c′′(a(t)) + a(t)c′′′(a(t)), is non-negative (using assumption 1). The right-hand
side is equal to −
(
rAW −(a(t)c
′(a(t))−c(a(t)))+a2c
′′
(a)
)
, which by assumption
1 is negative for all non-negative values of a and W . Hence a˙ ≤ 0 at the optimal
initial choice of W .
The function defined by a˙ = 0 is
Wa˙=0(a) ≡
1
rA
(
ac′(a)− c(a) − ac
′′
(a)
(
a+ (rP − rA)
µ
µ+ 1
))
.
Note that when µ = 0,
Wa˙=0(a) ≡
ac′(a)− c(a)− a2c
′′
(a)
rA
≤ 0
from assumption 1. Hence the functionWa˙=0(a) crosses the functionWµ=0(a) at
a point below the horizontal axis. If rP = rA, then Wa˙=0(a) ≤ 0 for all a ∈ [0, aˆ].
If rP < rA, then Wa˙=0(a) > WW˙=0(a) for sufficiently small a. Since Wa˙=0(a) is
continuous in a, the Wa˙=0(a) curve must therefore cross the WW˙=0(a) at a value
of a that is strictly less than a∗.
We can now determine the dynamics of a and W . The region of particular
interest for the analysis is defined as follows. Let W(a) ≡ {W ∈ R+|W ≤
WW˙=0(a) and W ≤ Wµ=0(a) and W ≥ Wa˙=0(a)} for a ∈ [0, aˆ]. Let D ≡⋃
a∈[0,aˆ]W(a). (The region D is illustrated as the shaded regions in figures 2 and
3.) For (a,W ) ∈ D, both a˙ and W˙ are non-positive. If rP = rA, then D is defined
as the (lower) area between the curves WW˙=0(a) and Wµ=0(a). If rP < rA, then
D is further defined by the curve Wa˙=0(a).
An initial choice of W on the portion of the Wµ=0(a) curve above the
WW˙=0(a) cannot be optimal. The reason is that the dynamics from this point
involve W˙ ≥ 0. Hence any path from such a point cannot converge to a steady
state, and by transversality cannot be optimal.
Hence the optimal initial choice ofW must lie on the portion of theWV ′=0(a)
curve below the WW˙=0(a). (Note that this must involve an initial effort level
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less than aˆ, and hence less than the myopic level aM .) The initial dynamics from
such a point are W˙ ≤ 0 and a˙ ≤ 0. The resulting path lies in the region D, and
hence W˙ ≤ 0 and a˙ ≤ 0 along all parts of an optimal path. The dynamics of
w(t) then follows from equation (8).
If rP = rA, then assumption 1 ensures that the function Wa˙=0(a) is negative
for all values of a ∈ [0, aˆ]. Hence the only feasible steady state is a =W = 0. If
rP < rA, then there is a second steady state with strictly positive a ∈ (0, a
∗) and
W ∈ (0,W ∗); the optimal path converges to this steady state. (Note that the
system cannot converge to a point on the horizontal axis. At such a point, the
agent’s effort is strictly positive but his value is 0. But this cannot be optimal
for the agent, who could generate a strictly positive value by reducing his effort.)

Proof of Proposition 5
The Proposition is immediate when the agent is relatively impatient (rP < rA),
since his equilibrium effort in this case is always strictly positive. To prove
the Proposition when the agent is equally patient (rP = rA), we consider the
behaviour of the system for small values of a and W .
From equation (A.24), as (a,W )→ (0, 0),
µ→
rP (v −W − c
′(a))− (a+ rP )ac
′′(a)
rAW + (a+ rP )ac′′(a)
and so becomes unbounded as the system approaches the steady state. Using
this fact, the dynamics of the agent’s effort, from equation (16), tends towards
[c
′′
(a(t)) + a(t)c
′′′
(a(t))]a˙(t)
= −
(
rAW − (a(t)c
′(a(t))− c(a(t))) + a2c′′(a)
)
+ a2(t)c
′′
(a(t))(rP − rA).
(A.25)
The expression in the square brackets on the left-hand side of this equation is of
order (big-O) c′′(a) in a. The right-hand side of the equation is of order (big-O)
c(a) in a and is linear in W .
Next, let the path followed by W in (a,W ) space be denoted W (a). Given
the dynamics described by a˙ and W˙ , this path is smooth. Consider a Taylor
expansion of this path close to the steady state (0, 0): W (a) =W (0)+aW ′(0)+
a2W ′′(0) + . . .. Obviously W (0) = 0; and since W (a) ≥ 0 for all a, it must
therefore be that W ′(0) ≥ 0. But since W˙ ≤ 0 (proposition 4), it must also be
that
W (a) ≤WW˙=0(a) ≡
ac′(a)− c(a)
rA
.
Therefore W ′(0) ≤ W ′
W˙=0
(a) = (ac′′(a)/rA)|a=0 = 0. Therefore W
′(0) = 0, and
the Taylor expansion of W (a) becomes W (a) = a2W ′′(0) + . . .. That is, on the
optimal path, W (a) = O(a2).
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Using this fact in equation (A.25), we see that the left-hand side is of order
(big-O) c′′(a) in a, while the right-hand side is of order (big-O) a2. Let β(a) ≡
a2/c′′(a) for a > 0. (For example, with quadratic costs c(a) = γa2 with γ > 0,
β(a) = a2/2γ.) Hence a˙ = O(β(a)) as (a,W )→ (0, 0).
Whether the integral
∫∞
0 a(t)dt of the agent’s effort is bounded above by a
finite constant then depends on the order of β(a). It is straightforward to show
that if β(a) is of order a2 or higher, then the rate of decrease is sufficiently slow
that the integral is unbounded. But if β(a) is of lower order than a2, then the
rate of decrease is such that the integral is finite. 
Proof of Proposition 6
We start by showing that in any stationary equilibrium wf (ht) = wf = 0 for all
ht. Suppose not i.e., wf > 0. If ws ≤ wf , then the optimal effort choice is 0 and
the equilibrium payoff to the principal is negative and setting wf (ht) = ws = 0 is
a profitable deviation after any ht. Suppose next that ws > wf > 0. A deviation
to ŵs(ht) = ws−wf , ŵf (ht) = 0 leaves the incentives for optimal effort choice in
period t unchanged since by assumption the future wage offers by the principal
do not depend on the current ones in a stationary equilibrium. This deviation
reduces the wage payments of the principal by wf > 0 and hence is clearly
profitable.
We compute next a wage offer ws = wSR > 0 and an effort choice function
a that constitute a stationary equilibrium for our game. We start by computing
the equilibrium expected payoff W SR to the agent. By standard arguments, we
have for ∆→ 0 :
W SR = max
a
awSR − c(a)
rA + a
. (A.26)
By solving the first-order condition for a and substituting, we get rAW
SR =
aSRc′(aSR)− c(aSR), where aSR solves problem (A.26.) Therefore we have after
substituting:
wSR = c′(aSR) +
aSRc′(aSR)− c(aSR)
rA
. (A.27)
Consider next a current (possibly deviating) wage offer of ws(ht) = w,wf (ht) =
0.15 The agent’s best response to this offer is given by a solution to the problem
maxa{aw∆− c(a)∆+(1− rA∆)(1−a∆)W
SR}. The first-order condition for the
problem is given by (w−W SR) = c′(a). Denote the solution to this problem by
a(w, 0). By the implicit function theorem,
da
dw
=
1
c′′(a(w, 0))
. (A.28)
15By the same argument as above, any deviation where wft > 0 is dominated by a deviation
where wft = 0, but with w
s set so that incentives are unchanged.
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The expected payoff to the principal from this wage offer is
a(w, 0)∆(v − w) + (1− rP∆)(1− a(w, 0)∆)V
SR, (A.29)
where V SR is the expected payoff to the principal along the path where wst =
wSR > 0 for all t. For ∆ → 0, the first-order condition for this problem is
(v − w − V SR) da
dw
− a(w, 0) = 0. Substituting from equation (A.28), we have
(v − w − V SR) − a(w, 0)c′′(a(w, 0)) = 0. At a stationary equilibrium, we must
have the first order condition satisfied at w = wSR. Therefore
wSR = v −
aSR(aSR + rP )
rP
c′′(aSR). (A.30)
In a stationary equilibrium, equations (A.27) and (A.30) must hold simulta-
neously. By our assumptions, the former gives wSR as an increasing function of
aSR while the latter gives a decreasing function. At aSR = 0, the former func-
tion starts above the latter, while in the limit as aSR →∞, the latter decreases
without bound. Therefore the values of these functions coincide at exactly one
point. 
Proof of Proposition 7
Preliminaries
Even though the stage game payoffs are not necessarily bounded, it is easy to
see that for every ∆, there is an M(∆) such that wft > M(∆) and w
s
t > M(∆)
are strictly dominated. Hence it is without loss of generality to consider wt ∈
[0,M(∆)]× [0,M(∆)]. Similarly, due to the convexity of the cost function, there
is an N(∆) such that a > N(∆) is strictly dominated (given that wages are
bounded). Under these natural restrictions, the set of paths {(wt, at)}
∞
t=0 is
compact in the product topology.
Let U denote the set of equilibrium payoff vectors in the game i.e., U =
{(V (w,a),W (w,a)) |(w,a) ∈ E }. Arguments similar to Abreu (1988) establish
that V and W are continuous in the product topology. Hence there exists an
equilibrium (w,a) ∈ E such that V (w,a) = min(w,a)∈E V (w,a) := V .
Our goal is to show that, for any history ht, w = (ws, wf ) = (wSR, 0) and
a = a(wt,W
SR), where a(wt,W
SR) is the best response by the agent if the
current wage offer is wt and all future wage offers are w(h
s) = wSR for all s > t
(and hence W SR denotes the continuation payoff to the agent along this path of
offers).
Minimal continuation payoffs for given wt
Since all continuation games are strategically equivalent, the set of sequential
equilibria at time t, E , is the same as the set at t+ 1. Hence, since the agent’s
own action is unobservable, his optimal choice of effort in period t depends only
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on the current offer wt and the continuation payoff W (w,a) induced by the
continuation equilibrium (w,a) ∈ E . For an arbitrary wt, we let a(wt,W (w,a))
denote this best response. We can find the principal’s worst sequentially rational
continuation equilibrium given the current offer wt = (w
s
t , w
f
t ) by solving
min
(w,a)∈E
a(wt,W (w,a))∆(v − w
s
t )− (1− a(wt,W (w,a))∆)w
f
t
+ (1− a(wt,W (w,a))∆)(1− rP∆)V (w,a).
Let (wwt ,awt) be a solution to this problem16 and let V (wt) be the minimized
value as a function of the current wage offer wt.
With these continuation strategies, it is clear that a current offer w∗t solving
w∗t ∈ argmaxwt V (wt), together with the continuation equilibrium w
∗ = (ww
∗
t ),
constitute a sequential equilibrium in which V (w∗t ) = V .
Optimal penal codes
Let {wt}
∞
t=0 denote the equilibrium path of wage offers in an arbitrary sequential
equilibrium of the game. Let {at}
∞
t=0 denote the best response of the agent to
these wages. The following Lemma contains a simple characterization of wage
paths that can be sustained in sequential equilibrium.
Lemma 3 A sequence {ŵt}
∞
t=0 of wage offers by the principal can be supported
as an equilibrium path of a sequential equilibrium in the contracting game if and
only if for all t,
∞∑
i=t
(1− rP∆)
(i−t)
(
âi∆(v − ŵ
s
i )− (1− âi∆)ŵ
f
i
)
≥ V , (A.31)
where {ât}
∞
t=0 is a best response to {ŵt}
∞
t=0.
Proof. (Only if.) If the inequality is violated, the continuation play following
t is not a sequential equilibrium by definition of V .
(If.) Consider the following strategies for the two players:
w(ht) = ŵt if h
t = (ŵ0, ..., ŵt−1),
w(ht) = ww0(ht) if ht 6= (ŵ0, ..., ŵt−1),
a(ht, wt) = ât if (h
t, wt) = (ŵ0, ..., ŵt−1, ŵt),
a(ht, wt) = a
w0(ht, wt) if (h
t, wt) 6= (ŵ0, ..., ŵt−1, ŵt).
Since (ww0 ,aw0) ∈ E , the continuation play forms a sequential equilibrium in
the continuation game after all possible deviations. Furthermore, by construc-
tion, the payoff to the principal is bounded from above by V after any deviation.
If inequality (A.31) holds at all t, no profitable deviation is profitable, and the
above strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. 
16Again the existence of a minimizer is given by the compactness of the set of equilibrium
paths and the continuity of the payoffs.
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Identifying continuation equilibrium profiles for payoff-minimizing equi-
libria
The remainder of the argument shows that we can take wwt = w after all deviat-
ing wage offers wt. This is the key step that shows that the worst punishment can
be taken to be stationary. Letw := {w |(w,a) ∈ E for some a, and V (w,a) = V }.
Notice that since (w,a) ∈ E , a must be a best response to w i.e., a = BR(w).
Furthermore, let wdev := argmaxw∈wW (w,BR(w)), i.e., any w
dev ∈ wdev in-
duces the highest payoff to the agent amongst the equilibrium continuation wage
offer strategies that keep the principal to expected payoff V . Since both play-
ers’ payoffs coincide for all continuation equilibria where the principal’s strategy
w ∈ wdev, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to an arbitrary
(fixed) representative wdev from wdev . Let adev(wt) denote the best response of
the agent to (wt,w
dev) i.e., a deviation to wt in period t followed by a continua-
tion wage strategy wdev. Also, define wdev ∈ argmaxwt V ((wt,w
dev),adev(wt)),
where
V ((wt,w
dev),adev(wt)) := a
dev(wt)∆(v − w
s
t )− (1− a
dev(wt)∆)w
f
t
+ (1− adev(wt)∆)(1− rP∆)V (w
dev,adev).
We now show that for current wages close to wdev, the worst continuation
for the principal is induced by the continuation strategy wdev. To show this, we
contrast two equilibria: the principals worst sequentially rational continuation
equilibrium given the current offer wt, which we have denoted (w
wt ,awt); and
the equilibrium
(
(wt,w
dev),adev(wt)
)
.
Lemma 4 There is a ε > 0 and ∆ > 0 such that if
∣∣wt − wdev∣∣ < ε and ∆ < ∆,
then V (wt) = V ((wt,w
dev),adev(wt)).
Proof. Observe first that for all wt,
V (wt) ≤ a
dev(wt)∆(v − w
s
t )− (1− a
dev(wt)∆)w
f
t
+ (1− adev(wt)∆)(1 − rP∆)V (w
dev,adev)
by definition. Hence for all δ > 0, there is a ∆ > 0 such that for all ∆ < ∆,
V (wt) ≤ V (w
dev,adev)+δ using the fact that in equilibrium, wages are bounded.
From the definition of wdev , we know from the principal’s first-order condition
for wst that
v − (wdev,s − wdev,f )− V (wdev,adev) > 0. (A.32)
Here, we use the fact that an increase in wst , with w
f
t and all future wages fixed,
must induce a greater current effort from the agent as a best response. Compare
this to the inequality that must hold for the principal’s payoff to be increasing
in at in the equilibrium (w
wt,awt):
v − (wst −w
f
t )− V (wt) > 0. (A.33)
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From inequality (A.32), we can see that there is an ε > 0 such that inequality
(A.33) holds if |wt − w
dev| < ε.
If the worst continuation equilibrium after wt, (w
wt ,awt) /∈ wdev, then we can
find another equilibrium with a lower payoff to the principal. To see this, note
simply that if (wwt ,awt) /∈ wdev , then either V (wwt ,awt) > V or V (wwt,awt) =
V and W (wwt ,awt) < W (wdev,adev). In the first case, the principal’s payoff can
be reduced by making a small enough unconditional payment to the agent in
the current period of the continuation game. This has no effect on the agent’s
optimal continuation strategies, maintains the agent’s participation constraint
and increases the agent’s continuation value. But the agent’s optimal current
effort level a(wt,W ) is strictly decreasing in W if a(wt,W ) > 0. Hence this
unconditional payment reduces the agent’s current effort, and so the principal’s
value.
In the second case, a switch to the continuation equilibrium (wdev,adev)
increases the agent’s continuation payoff without violating any incentive con-
straints, since (wdev ,adev) ∈ E by assumption. Hence the payoff to the principal
is reduced in this case also. Furthermore by Lemma 3, the path with reduced
wage payments can also be supported as a sequential equilibrium. 
The previous Lemma establishes a lower bound to what the principal can
guarantee, by choosing wt close to w
dev . Hence the principal’s lowest equilibrium
payoff cannot be below that resulting from (wdev ,wdev): a fact that we establish
in the next lemma.
Lemma 5 In the continuous-time limit, the lowest payoff V to the payoff is
given by V = V ((wdev ,wdev),adev(wt)).
Proof. Since by definition, V ≥ V (wt) for all wt, Lemma 4 implies that V ≥
V ((wt,w
dev),adev(wt)). Since (w
dev,adev) ∈ E , w(ht) = wdev is a best response
for the principal for all ht, and therefore V = V ((wdev ,wdev),adev(wt)). 
Proof of the main result
The final step is to bring together these Lemmas, noting that the best current
wage for the principal, given the equilibrium continuation path of wages wdev,
is wdev. Hence we have constructed a stationary equilibrium with payoff V to
the principal; but since there is a unique stationary equilibrium, we can identify
this equilibrium precisely.
Lemma 6 The payoff to the principal in the stationary equilibrium coincides
with the worst equilibrium payoff for the principal: V = V SR.
Proof. By the previous Lemmas, we have V = V (w,a), where wt = w
dev ∀ht
and a(ht, wt) = a
dev(wt) ∀h
t. By the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium,
we conclude that wdev = wSR and a(ht, wt) = a(wt,W
SR), and the claim follows.

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Proof of Lemma 2
The proof has two parts. First, consider two continuation games in which
(V (T ),W (T )) =
(
V SR,W
)
and (V (T ),W (T )) =
(
V SR,W ′
)
with W < W ′.
We claim that the principal’s payoff is higher in the first game. Take the best
(from the principal’s point of view) equilibrium wage sequence of the second
continuation game with W (T ) = W ′. If the wages w(t) for t ≤ T are the same
in the first continuation game, then the agent’s continuation payoff W (t) in the
first continuation game must be lower than in the second, for all t ≤ T. But then
the agent’s equilibrium action a(t) in the first continuation game is higher than
in the second, for all t ≤ T , and so the principal’s payoff is also higher. Hence
V (t) > V SR. And by Lemma 3 in this Appendix, these wages can be supported
in a sequentially rational equilibrium.
The second part of the proof shows that V (W ) = V SR. Since W is a sequen-
tially rational continuation payoff for the agent, we know that V (W ) ≥ V SR. If
V (W ) > V SR, then consider the modified wage sequence where the principal of-
fers wt = 0 for initial period of length ε and then reverts to the equilibrium path
associated with payoffs (V (W ),W ). By continuity, the new path also induces a
payoff to the principal above V SR and hence can be supported in a sequentially
rational equilibrium, by Lemma 3. But the agent gets a lower equilibrium payoff,
contradicting the assumption that W is the lowest payoff to the agent. 
Proof of Proposition 9
Denote the initial value to the principal in the best WRP equilibrium by V0.
Suppose that Vt < V0 for some t in that equilibrium, in the discrete-time version
of the game with period length ∆. Let τ be min{t|Vt > Vt+1}. By definition,
Vτ = V0; and by the definition of a WRP equilibrium, Wτ+1 > Wτ .
But then, since the best response of the agent a(wt,Wt+1) is decreasing in
Wt+1, we can construct a sequentially rational equilibrium payoff (V
′,W ′) with
continuation payoffs (Vτ ,Wτ ) such that V
′ > Vτ and W
′ < Wτ , contradicting
the assumption that V0 = Vτ is the highest WRP payoff to the principal. 
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